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Abstract 
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) are attracting increasing attention in the maritime 
industry. Despite the expected benefits in reducing human error and significantly increasing the overall 
safety level, the development of autonomous ships would undoubtedly introduce new risks. The overall 
goal of this work is to develop an approach to evaluate the risk level of the major hazards associated 
with MASS. To that extent, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) method is used in 
conjunction with Evidential Reasoning (ER) and Rule-based Bayesian Network (RBN) to quantify the 
risk levels of the identified hazards. The results show that ‘interaction with manned vessels and 
detection of objects’ contributes the most to the overall risk of MASS operations, followed by ‘cyber-
attacks’, ‘human error’ and ‘equipment failure’. The findings provide useful insights on the major 
hazards and can aid the overall safety assurance of MASS.   
Keywords: Maritime risk, maritime safety, maritime autonomous surface ships, Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Bayesian Networks (BN) 
1. Introduction 
Much research has shown that human error contributes to 80-90% of shipping accidents 
directly or indirectly (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010; Heij and Knapp, 2018). Maritime Autonomous 
Surface Ships (MASS), defined by the IMO (2018) as “ships which, to a varying degree, can 
operate independently of human interaction”, are attracting increasing attention in the 
maritime industry as an emerging solution to reduce human errors.  
IMO (2018) defines the degrees of autonomy of a MASS in four levels as follows:  
(1) Ship with automated processes and decision support: Seafarers are onboard to operate and 
control the vessel; some operations may be automated and at times be unsupervised but 
seafarers are always present and ready to take control,  
(2) Remotely controlled ship with seafarers on board: the ship is controlled and operated 
remotely; however seafarers are onboard and ready to take control,  
(3) Remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board: ship is unmanned and controlled from 
a remote location, and  
(4) Fully autonomous ship: the operating system can make decisions and determine actions by 
itself. 
 
The are many expected benefits of MASS, in comparison to conventional marine systems, such 
as enhancing safety and security (IMO, 2009; Burmeister et al., 2014a, 2014b; Ahvenjärvi, 
2016; Höyhtyä et al., 2017; Levander, 2017; Komianos, 2018; Porathe and Rødseth, 2019), 
improving human resource management (Burmeister et al., 2014b; Levander, 2017; Komianos, 
2018), reduced operational costs (Burmeister et al., 2014a; Ahvenjärvi, 2016; Jokioinen et al., 
2016; MUNIN, 2016; Kretschmann et al., 2017; Komianos, 2018) and reducing air pollution 




IMO is currently looking at the integration of advanced technologies, including autonomous 
ships, in the regulatory framework on areas such as safety (e.g. related to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, SOLAS), collision regulations (related to the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, COLREGs), loading and stability 
(related to the International Convention on Load Lines), training of seafarers and fishers (see 
the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, STCW), search and rescue (related the International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue, SAR), tonnage measurement and others (IMO, 2018). 
 
Despite the abovementioned advantages, MASS still face several challenges in their 
development and barriers to their wider adoption, including crew unemployment (Komianos, 
2018), national and international regulatory barriers (Danish Maritime Authority, 2017; 
Ramboll and CORE Advokatfirma, 2017; Komianos, 2018), extensive training costs for staff 
(Burmeister et al., 2014b; Ahvenjärvi, 2016; Danish Maritime Authority, 2017; Levander, 
2017), large costs for developing new infrastructure (IMO, 2009; Komianos, 2018), 
maintenance costs (Porathe et al., 2018) and technical challenges in  ship design and operations 
system design (Delft et al, 2016; Höyhtyä et al, 2017; Wróbel et al., 2017).  
 
MASS can significantly reduce the accidents caused by human error; they cannot however 
totally eliminate them. In addition, because MASS consist of several interconnected systems, 
some of which are based on newly proposed or advanced technologies, there is little evidence 
yet to prove that they are risk-free (Komianos, 2018). In fact, it has been argued that MASS 
will introduce new types of risk; see the accidents involving autonomous vehicles in road 
transportation which repeatedly occurred in the past years. Rødseth and Burmeister (2015) 
point out 5 unacceptable hazards in the initial ship configuration: 
1. Interaction with other ships 
2. Errors in detection and classification of small to medium size objects are critical 
3. Failure in object detection, particularly in low visibility, can cause powered collisions. 
4. Propulsion system breakdown 
5. Very heavy weather may make it difficult to manoeuvre ship safely. 
 
Despite the growing number of studies on MASS (e.g. Haworth et al., 2016; Norris, 2017; 
Porathe et al., 2018), they are still at an early stage. Rødseth and Burmeister (2015) describe 
some conceptual hazards that might happen in MASS operations. Given the hazardous nature 
of their operation, it is important to assess the severity of the related hazards and their 
uncertainty. Furthermore, there is a lack of much research on the development of conceptual 
risk models to analyse the risks in MASS operations. The literature is expanding fast in this 
emerging area; see for example Gu et al. (2020) for a survey of the literature on autonomous 
marine vessels and Hoem (2019), which updates Porathe et al. (2018), for a review of the 
present and future of risk assessment of MASS. In addition, Fan et al. (2020) propose a 
framework for the identification of factors that influence the navigational risk of MASS and 
also present a very comprehensive literature review of the area. 
We contribute to this growing research area by investigating the important hazards related to 
autonomous ships. The results of this research can support better understanding of the relevant 
hazards and their risk levels. The stakeholders, including designers and operators,  could use 
this research to focus on the important hazard, thus, addressing the areas that could help 




The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of the current 
hazards of MASS operations. Section 3 describes the research methods applied in this study 
and Section 4 presents the risk data analysis and results. Discussion and conclusions are drawn 
in Section 5. 
2. Hazards in MASS operations 
Based on a thorough literature review, the main hazard categories in MASS operations are 
identified and presented in Table 1. We note that the literature in this area is scarce, but there 
is now an increasing number of papers on MASS, including several survey papers. Munim 
(2019) reviews the autonomous ships development projects and their benefits from economic, 
environmental and social perspectives; whereas Dreyer and Oltedal (2019) present a review of 
the safety challenges of autonomous vessels. Kim et al. (2020) reviews the impact of MASS 
on regulations, technologies, and industries. Wróbel et al. (2020) undertake a thorough 
literature review of the operational features of remotely controlled vessels (3rd degree of 
autonomy) based on the principles of System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and 
identifies existing and future research directions in the field of autonomous vessels.  
 
Through the review of the relevant literature (see below for more) we have identified the hazard 
categories that are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Hazard categories in MASS operations 
Hazard category Authors Description 
Human error Burmeister et al. (2014a, b);  
MUNIN (2015); Rødseth 
and Burmeister (2015); 
Ahvenjärvi (2016); 
Bolbot et al. (2018); Ramos 
et al. (2019) 
Although MASS will replace most of the human 
duties, there are still some hazards related to, for 
instance, designing and remoting operations and 




and detection of 
objects 
Ahvenjärvi (2016); 
Komianos (2018); Porathe 
(2019); Ramos et al. (2019) 
Since no crew is onboard, the navigation cannot 
satisfy Rule 5 of COLREG. MASS might also 
cause collisions due to poor interaction with 




Banda et al. (2015); MUNIN 
(2015); Rødseth and 
Burmeister (2015); Wróbel 
et al. (2017; 2018b) 
As the development of MASS is still at an early 
stage, they are very sensitive to some external 
factors such as winter navigation in ice area and 
heavy weather 
System failure Burmeister et al. (2014b); 
Ahvenjärvi (2016); Wróbel 
et al. (2018a; 2018b); 
Thieme et al. (2018); 
Ringbom (2019) 
With no humans onboard, there might be some 
problems when communication links break down 
or systems behave unpredictably. 
Cyberattacks Kavallieratos et al. (2018); 
Vinnem and Utne (2018); 
Tam and Jones (2018); 
Wróbel et al. (2018a;2018b; 
2020) 
Given the strong dependence on the internet, 
operation systems and communications are 
susceptible to cyber attacks. 
Equipment failure Wróbel et al. (2017; 2018b; 
2020); Utne et al. (2020) 
There might be some serious consequences that 
cannot be controlled effectively, especially in 
emergency situations, such as fires, sensor 






2.1 Human error 
Although MASS will help reduce human error, Ahvenjärvi (2016) argues that human error or 
human-task mismatch cannot be totally eliminated because the human element is still involved 
in the design and remote control. Human error might shift from the moment of the incident to 
the pre-voyage stage, due to the large scope of coding and programming (Burmeister et al., 
2014b). The related systems cannot be fully tested or reviewed until the actual ship operations. 
Due to the large number of software package programming and complicated coding, there is a 
likelihood that software engineers may make some mistakes during the design or the 
programming phase and, therefore, leave software errors -what is referred to as bugs- in the 
system (Ahvenjärvi, 2016; Bolbot et al., 2018). In addition, poor design and interface will cause 
more human factor related issues during the operations (Ahvenjärvi, 2016). Operators in the 
shore control centre (SCC) face the same or, even, new human error hazards as they may not 
be fully aware of the actual conditions on the scene (Burmeister et al., 2014a). Autonomous 
ships also need periodic maintenance, either remotely or through physical contact. In both ways 
there will be some human error involved and these should be considered as hazards of MASS 
operations (MUNIN, 2015; Rødseth and Burmeister, 2015).  
Coping with the human elements relating to MASS, a parallel body of relevant literature is 
conducted on ergonomics (the discipline concerned with the understanding of interaction 
among humans and the other elements of a system) and non-technical skills, especially related 
to the future role and responsibilities of the actors involved, respectively. Task analysis 
methods, which are widely used by human factors and ergonomics professionals, have been 
used to address the system-human interaction in autonomous shipping. Thieme and Utne (2017) 
model the interaction between the human operator and an autonomous underwater vehicle. 
According to Ramos et al. (2019),  while the studies on autonomous surface vessels are few in 
the literature, the modelling of the interaction human-system and human error from a Human 
Reliability Analysis  (HRA) perspective is even fewer. A task analysis of operators for the 
collision avoidance of autonomous vessels is reported in Ramos et al (2019). Ramos et. al. 
(2020) propose a human-system interaction in an autonomy method based on a concurrent task 
analysis.  
Non-technical skill requirements are also very critical in the new era of autonomous shipping, 
and to a large extent they will be different with those of conventional ships (Kitada et al., 2018). 
Some human positions onboard ships will also disappear in the future (Sharma et al. 2019) and 
replaced by remote controllers. Mallam et al. (2019) explore the effects of autonomous 
shipping on future work organisation and roles of humans within maritime operations. Kim 
and Mallam (2020) discuss leadership competencies related to the IMO STCW Convention.  
2.2 Interaction with manned vessels and detection of objects 
Previous research has addressed the interaction between MASS and manned vessels concerning 
the detection of objects (Burmeister et al., 2014b; Rødseth and Burmeister, 2015; MUNIN, 
2015; Ahvenjärvi, 2016; Höyhtyä, et al., 2017; Wróbel et al., 2018b; Porathe and Rødseth, 
2019; Ramos et al., 2019). Although Komianos (2018) has stated that MASS can largely reduce 
the risk of collision and comply with the COLREGs, they also argue that MASS does not satisfy 
Rule 5 of COLREG, which requires proper look-out by sight and hearing on every ship to 
assess the situation and the risk of collision. MUNIN (2015) also identifies several relevant 
hazards in MASS operations. Finally, much research focuses also on collision avoidance and 
guidance systems; see for example Perera et al. (2018) who propose a ship collision situation 
avoidance algorithm based on fuzzy logic to support decision-making systems in autonomous 
vessels and Xu et al.  (2019) who use AIS data to propose a path generation system.  
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2.3 Interaction with the physical environment 
This hazard category may include heavy weather, low visibility, areas of icing, ice navigation 
and strong tidal systems (Banda et al, 2015; MUNIN, 2015; Rødseth and Burmeister, 2015; 
Wróbel et al., 2017, 2018b). Winter navigation in ice areas for a MASS would most likely 
involve ice breaker assistance, which poses a risk due to the close proximity of the vessels 
(Banda et al., 2015). Heavy weather may entail low speed manoeuvring to avoid structural 
damages to the vessel. All these types of manoeuvring are traditionally performed in manual 
steering (Wróbel et al., 2017).  
2.4 System failure 
Since autonomous ships heavily rely on information technology (IT), one might wonder if these 
systems are as capable as human beings. Autonomous systems are based on machine-learning, 
which requires extensive training to cover most of the potential real-life situations. However, 
it cannot cover all situations, and the exceptional situations are linked to the most difficult and 
dangerous system errors because the behaviour of the system is not predictable (Ahvenjärvi, 
2016). Furthermore, the systems and software design should have certain tolerance when an 
unexpected failure occurs. Quantifying the tolerance to make the system run smoothly and, at 
the same time, ensuring the safety of the voyage is not trivial. It is argued that communication 
link breakdowns will be the new hazards introduced by the operation of MASS (e.g. Burmeister 
et al., 2014b; Wróbel et al., 2016; Wróbel et al., 2018a, 2018b; Thieme et al., 2018). MUNIN 
(2015) has also identified a hazard related to system failure. 
2.5 Cyberattacks 
Due to the dependency of autonomous ships on ICT, cyberattacks are considered as a major 
type of hazards in MASS operations (MUNIN, 2015; Hogg & Ghosh, 2016; Rolls-Royce, 2016; 
Ghaderi, 2018; Komianos, 2018; Wróbel et al., 2018b, 2020). Many cyberattacks have been 
reported in recent years, see the incidents involving COSCO US in 2018, Maersk in 2017 and 
the Port of Antwerp in 2011-2012. Hand (2016) quotes Lar Jensen (CEO of CyberKeel) who 
claims that “autonomous ships will not become a mainstream reality in the next few years due 
to unresolved cyber-security issues on the technology”.  
2.6 Equipment failure 
Equipment failure during sailings is another major hazard category. Given that there is no crew 
onboard an autonomous ship, in the case of failure the ship needs to be immobilised and wait 
for the repairing team to arrive. MUNIN (2015) has identified six relevant hazards, including 
‘fire loss of ship or systems’, ‘sensor failure – loss of control’, ‘temporary loss of electricity 
(e.g. due to black-out) - loss of control’, ‘failure of the ship's IT structure (e.g. due to fire in the 
server room) - no control’, ‘total loss of propulsion’, and ‘total loss of rudder function’. 
Furthermore, Wróbel et al. (2017) identify all possible scenarios for preventing or handling 
fires on a MASS and stated that a fire accident is an extremely difficult challenge in MASS 
operations. Wróbel et al. (2018b, 2020) also argue that sensor failures will also have significant 








The hazards identified through the literature review (see Section 2) were further assessed using 
Likert scale [1-5] by a group of 6 experts (see No. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 in Table 3). Table 2 
presents the average score of each hazard based on the experts’ opinions. Based on the hazard-
screening step (Yang et al., 2010) in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology (e.g. 
Yang et al., 2013), the hazards that have received an average score above 3 (i.e. the average of 
the [1-5] Liker scale) were further assessed in the Bayesian model.  
Table 2: Results of first-run questionnaire 
Score Hazards of MASS 
Human error 
3.5 Human error due to a large scope of coding and programming when designing the 
system 
3.2 Failure due to poor design of on-board programme 
3.3 Failure due to poor design of remote control centre programme 
2.7 Human error due to remote control maintenance 
2.7 Human error due to physical contact maintenance 
3.0 Human error due to unfamiliarity of how MASS may react in an unknown scenario 
Interaction with manned vessels and detection of objects 
4.0 Collision due to poor interaction with manned vessel(s) in heavy traffic 
3.2 Failure in detection of semi-submerged objects that are adrift 
3.3 Failure to determine correct action when interacting with vessels that are: towing, 
restricted in an ability to manoeuvre, or trawling 
2.8 Collision due to poor detection of objects or vessels 
3.0 Failure in detection of small objects such as castaway/wreckage 
Interaction with the physical environment 
3.7 Failure due to heavy weather 
3.2 Failure due to strong tidal effect 
3.0 Failure due to ice navigation 
2.5 Collision due to low visibility 
System failure 
3.7 Failure due to the breakdown of communication link  
3.5 Failure due to the jamming or spoofing of AIS or GPS signals 
Cyber attacks 
3.5 Communication between ships and shore control centre due to hacker attacks 
3.2 Failure of the operation system due to hacker attacks 
Equipment failure 
4.3 Fire loss of ship or systems 
3.5 Sensor failure – loss of control 
3.5 Temporary loss of electricity (e.g. due to black-out) - loss of control 
3.3 Failure of the ship's IT structure (e.g. due to fire in the server room) - no control 
3.0 Total loss of propulsion 
3.0 Total loss of rudder function 
After the hazard-screening step, a larger number of experts were contacted for an in-depth risk 
estimation, and consequently 9 experts (see Table 3 for their experience and expertise) have 
participated in the survey. Based on similar studies we feel that the number of experts is 
appropriate for our study which demonstrates the feasibility of the proposed method in MASS 
risk analysis. With the increase in the number of MASS applications in future, more data can 
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be gathered to update our current findings without the need to change the risk model much as 
the BN can easily accommodate new evidence. 
Table 3: Respondents’ background 
Expert  Position Work experience Familiarity 
1 Captain More than 15 years The Captain had been trained in simulation to 
provide expertise for the development of MASS. He 
also helped in validating the questionnaires and 
provided a speech in MASS workshop. 
2 Captain/Harbour 
officer 
More than 15 years CEO of an UK port with automatic terminal.  
3 Risk Consultant 6 – 10 years Risk consultant in the maritime industry. 
4 Professor More than 15 years This respondent is familiar with the context of 
MASS and has published several papers and 
obtained several projects related to this area. 
5 IMO staff: 
Maritime Safety 
Administration 
6 – 10 years This respondent involved in projects related to 
MASS safety regulation. He also helped in 
validating the questionnaires. 
6 Lecturer/Assistant 
Professor 
6 – 10 years This respondent is familiar with the context of 
MASS and has published several papers in this area. 
7 Reader/Associate 
Professor 
6 – 10 years This respondent is familiar with the context of 
MASS and has published several papers in this area. 
8 2nd Officer (2/O) 6 – 10 years This respondent has been trained to provide 
expertise for the development of MASS. 
9 Chief Officer 
(C/O) 
6 – 10 years This respondent has been trained to provide 
expertise for the development of MASS. 
The final list of hazards that were further assessed through a questionnaire survey is presented 
in Table 8; the table also summarizes the final results.  
Our study utilises a combination of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) with 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) and Rule-based Bayesian Network (RBN) in order to rank the 
related hazards. Hazards are here defined as a "source of potential harm" i.e a source of risk, 
and risk is defined as the "effect of uncertainty on objectives" and is often expressed in "terms 
of a combination of the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the 
associated likelihood of occurrence" (ISO Guide 73 – Risk Management Vocabulary). FMEA, 
which has been widely used in risk assessment, refers to risk in terms of severity (C), likelihood 
of failure mode/cause (L) and detection (P); as per the IEC 60812:2018 standard. Through 
multiplying L, C, and P, we can easily identify top serious hazards based on the risk priority 
numbers (RPNs); see Section 3.2.1 for more. FMEA has been criticised due to its 
oversimplified calculations that categorise different hazards into the same group even when 
they are associated to have different conditions (see Section 3.2.1). To better utilise FMEA for 
risk assessment, many hybrid methods have been presented in the literature. For instance, 
FMEA is combined with fuzzy logic to reduce uncertainties (e.g. Pillay and Wang 2003), with 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) to improve the aggregation of expert judgement (e.g. Yang and 
Wang, 2015). Lately, it helps to develop FMEA-based Bayesian networks that could be used 
to perform various sensitivity analyses and scenario simulations (e.g. Yang et al., 2008; Wan 
et al., 2019). According to Yang et al. (2009), ER allows for the aggregation of multiple experts’ 
subjective evaluations under uncertainty (i.e. incompleteness) and avoids loss of useful 
information which is the case when using other aggregation methods (e.g. fuzzy logic). The 
aggregated data can then be converted into conditional probability tables (CPTs) via a rule-
based approach.  
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3.1 Data collection 
A questionnaire is designed and distributed to experts in order to obtain their degree of belief 
(DoB) for the risk parameters, namely the L, C and P associated with each hazard. Compared 
with a normal Likert scale questionnaire, using DoB involves respondents’ uncertainty when 
answering questions and, thus, provides more useful insights. Respondents indicate their DoB 
-expressed as a percentage to which they endorse each statement- using a five-point Likert 
scale; see Table 4 for the linguistic terms used for each parameter and Table 5 for their 
definitions. It is obvious that for any of the three parameters (L, C and P) the sum of the DoB 
of all Likert items should be equal to 100%. For example, an expert might assess the likelihood 
of 'Failure due to heavy weather' to be 5% Medium, 10% Low, and 85% Very Low, and the 
consequences as 10% Critical, 40% Moderate, 30% Marginal, and 20% Negligible. 
 
Table 4: Linguistic scale for each parameter 
Parameter/Items 1 2 3 4 5 
L: likelihood Very low low average frequent Highly frequent 
C: severity negligible marginal moderate critical catastrophic 




unlikely average likely highly likely 
 
Table 5: Indices of Likelihood, Severity and Probability of Unpredictability  
Likelihood of failure Definition 
Very Low (VL) Failure is unlikely but possible during lifetime 
Low (L) Likely to happen once a year 
Average (A) Occasional failure (once per quarter) 
High (H) Repeated failure (once per month) 





Negligible (N) At most a single minor incident or unscheduled maintenance required. 
Marginal (MA) Minor system damage. Operations interrupted slightly and resumed to its usual 
operational mode within a short period (e.g. less than 6 hours). 
Moderate (MO) Moderate system damage. Operations and production interrupted marginally 
and resumed to its usual operational mode within more than 12 hours. 
Critical (CR) Major system damage. 
Operations stopped. High degree of operational interruption. 
Catastrophic (CA) Total system loss. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 
affects sailing operations and/or involves non-compliance with government 
regulations. 
 
Probability of the 
failure being undetected 
Definition 
Highly unlikely (HU) Possible to detect without checks or maintenance 
Unlikely (U) Possible to detect through regular checks or maintenance 
Average (A) Possible to detect through intensive checks or maintenance 
Likely (L) Difficult to detect through intensive or regular checks or maintenance 
Highly likely (HL) Impossible to detect even through intensive or regular checks or maintenance 
Source: Adapted from Yang et al. (2008) and Alyami et al. (2019) 
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3.2 Data analysis method 
We utilise a hybrid approach that combines Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) with 
ER and Rule-based Bayesian Networks (RBN) to evaluate the importance of the assessed 
hazard. The rationale of using ER is to be able to obtain a solution even when the DoB 
distribution for a responder does not sum to 100%; while RBN is used to overcome the 
limitations of FMEA.  The following sections describe in detail the methods used in our 
proposed approach; see Figure 1 for an illustration. 
 
 
Fig 1. Flowchart of the methodology 
 
3.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is widely used for the systematic evaluation of the severity of potential failure modes 
and is one of the most popular safety and reliability analysis tools (Yang et al., 2008).  
Following the IEC 60812:2018 standard, hazards related to autonomous vessels are assessed 
taking into account three parameters: the likelihood of a hazard (L), its consequence severity 
(C) and the probability of the hazard being undetected (P). The Risk Priority Number (RPN), 
a numeric assessment of the risk, is defined as follows: 
𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝐿𝑖 × 𝐶𝑗 × 𝑃𝑘 
 
The application of FMEA in risk and safety assessments and, especially, the use of the RPN 
concept has been criticised as follows (Yang et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2011): 
1. The results of RPN are produced in such a way that no weighting of the provided 
evidence is used, and the interrelationships of variables are not considered. 
2. It is difficult to obtain precise values for associated parameters (i.e. L, C, and P).  
3. The same value of risk priority may indicate different risk profiles (we are thus unable 
to provide a backward diagnose/inference). 
4. The RPNs used for identifying the criticality factors strongly influence the results.  




Several methods based on uncertainty treatment theories -such as fuzzy logic, Dempster-Shafer 
(D-S) theory, Grey system theory, BN and Markov models- have been developed to enhance 
the performance of FMEA (e.g. Yang et al., 2008; Alyami et al., 2019). A BN approach is 
applied in this study as it is more appropriate for the structure of the identified hazards.  
 
3.2.2 Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
ER, based on the Dempster-Shafer theory, is widely used to aggregate information with 
uncertain subjective data to produce a cohesive result. Compared to similar methods, ER is 
more precise when dealing with complex systems that are associated with various types of 
uncertainties, especially for the set of evaluation grades presented in Section 3.1. The current 
widely used ER algorithm for evidence aggregation is presented in Yang and Xu (2002).  
In this study, ER is used to aggregate experts’ opinion on the risk parameters for each hazard 
related to MASS operations. We obtain the judgement of each risk parameter from the experts. 
𝛽𝑗
𝑘 (𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑁;  𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐿) denotes the conditional degree of belief assigned to the j-th 
risk parameter by the k-th expert in a group of experts (𝑘 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝐿).   As the experience of 
experts depends on various factors such as their backgrounds, years of experience etc, 
judgements could be weighted. Thus, relative importance weights 𝑤𝑘 (𝑘 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝐿) for the 
experts are defined, such as ∑ 𝑤𝑛 = 1
𝑘
𝑛=1 . 𝛽𝑗
𝑘 can thus be transformed into basic probability 
masses 𝑚𝑗










To aggregated the collected judgements from different experts, a combined belief degree 
(𝑚𝑗
𝐼(𝑘+1)
) is calculated from k+1 judgements by combining all 𝑚𝑗
𝑘 (𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑁; 𝑘 =
1,2, … , 𝐿) values. The overall aggregation can be calculated using the following equations: 
𝑚𝑗
𝐼(𝑘+1)





















Then the combined belief degrees 𝑚𝑗
𝐼(𝐿)














3.2.3 Rule-based Bayesian networks (RBN) 
 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of FMEA, Yang et al. (2008) propose a fuzzy-rule 
Bayesian reasoning approach, which involves five steps as follows: 
(1) Establishment of FRB with belief structures in FMEA 
(2) Failure estimation and transformation 
(3) Rule aggregation using a Bayesian reasoning mechanism 
(4) Development of utility functions for failure ranking, and 
(5) Validation using benchmarking and sensitivity analysis 
 
We therefore introduce a six-step approach (see also Figure 1) as follows. 
 
Step 1: Identification of hazards (failure modes) in MASS operations  
Based on the results of the literature review, six hazard categories that pose risks on MASS 
operations are identified. Each hazard category consists of several hazards; these are described 
in Table 6.  
 
Step 2: Construction of the Bayesian network 
We model a Bayesian network (BN) in which hazards are the root nodes (yellow nodes), hazard 
categories are the intermediate nodes (orange nodes), and the overall risk is the leaf node (red 
node). The BN is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
To describe the influential magnitudes of hazards to the overall risk, we propose a MASS risk 
model that assigns five linguistic states of risk (RPN) as “very low”, “low”, “average”, “high”, 
and “very high” to each node. The linguistic states of L, C, and P for each hazard in the FMEA-
based BN are also assigned (c.f. Section 3.1). 
 
Fig.2: The developed Bayesian network 
 
Step 3: Establishing the rule-based systems with a belief structure in a MASS risk model and 
FMEA-based BN  
 
A rule-based approach is used to define the causal relationships and influential magnitudes 
among all nodes in the BN. The approach describes the causality between the IF and THEN 
parts with several rules, converting p attendance attributes {𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑝} (IF part) into q states 
{𝐶1, 𝐶2, … , 𝐶𝑞}  (THEN part) by assigning a belief degree 𝛽𝑠  (𝑠 = 1,2 … , 𝑞)  to 𝐶𝑠  (𝑠 ∈ 𝑞) 
(Alyami et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2020).  
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For example, the wth conventional IF-THEN rule (denoted by 𝑅𝑤) can be expressed as: 
𝑅𝑤: IF 𝐴1
𝑤 and 𝐴2
𝑤 and … and 𝐴𝑝
𝑤, THEN {(𝛽1
𝑤, 𝐶1), (𝛽2
𝑤, 𝐶2), … , (𝛽𝑞
𝑤, 𝐶𝑞)}.  
Combining all rules, a rule-based set with multiple-inputs and multiple-outputs is developed. 
Several rules are used in the MASS risk model (i.e. hazard categories and hazards) and its sub-
FMEA-based BN (i.e. hazards with L, C, and P). If, for example, an expert provides a 
judgement for the hazard ‘Failure due to heavy weather’ (PE1) as L = “very low”, C = 
“Negligible” and P = “Very unlikely”, then the total risk is “very low”. Using an IF-THEN rule, 
the above judgements can be converted into a rule as follow: 
  
Rule 1: IF very low (L1), and negligible (C1), and very unlikely (P1),  
        THEN {(1, very low (R1)), (0, low (R2)), (0, average (R3)), (0, high (R4)), (0, very high 
(R5))}. 
 
The above rule can be further described as follows: 
Rule 1: if L is very low, C is negligible, and P is very unlikely, then R is very low with a 100% 
DoB, low with a 0% DoB, average with a 0% DoB, high with a 0% DoB, and very high 
with a 0% DoB.  
 
Following the same rationale, the belief structures that used to aggregate the expert’s belief for 
the specific hazards can be established; Table 6 illustrates part of the 125 rules (5×5×5) and the 
associated DoB distribution. 
 
Table 6: The established FMEA-based BN with a belief structure 
Rule Parameters in the IF part DoB in the THEN part 
No L C P R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
1 Very low (L1) Negligible (C1) Very unlikely (P1) 1     
2 Very low (L1) Negligible (C1) Unlikely (P2) 0.67 0.33    
3 Very low (L1) Negligible (C1) Average (P3) 0.67  0.33   
4 Very low (L1) Negligible (C1) Likely (P4) 0.67   0.33  
5 Very low (L1) Negligible (C1) Very likely (P5) 0.67    0.33 
… … … … … … … … … 
121 Very high (L5) Catastrophic (C5) Very unlikely (P1) 0.33    0.67 
122 Very high (L5) Catastrophic (C5) Unlikely (P2)  0.33   0.67 
123 Very high (L5) Catastrophic (C5) Average (P3)   0.33  0.67 
124 Very high (L5) Catastrophic (C5) Likely (P4)    0.33 0.67 
125 Very high (L5) Catastrophic (C5) Very likely (P5)     1 
 
 
Step 4: Rule aggregation using a Bayesian Reasoning mechanism  
A conditional probability table (CPT) for each node is derived using the IF-THEN rules (Table 
6). For example, the first rule of Table 7 can be expressed as follows: 
R1: IF very low, negligible and very unlikely, THEN {(1, (R1)), (0, (R2)), (0, (R3)), (0, (R4)), 
(0, (R5))}. This represents a condition that L1, C1, P1, the probability of R (DoB) is p(R|L1, 
C1, P1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0).  
 
The prior probabilities are aggregated to produce the results (i.e. marginal probabilities). 
Having analysed the prior probabilities for all nodes in the BN, the marginal (posterior) overall 
probability 𝑝(𝑅ℎ) can be calculated as follows: 
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, (ℎ = 1, 2, … , 5)  
where h is the number of states of R. 
 



















R1 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0 
R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R5 0 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 1 
 
Step 5: Converting the obtained results into crisp values by using utility functions 
Utility values are assigned to all nodes in the MASS risk model and its sub-FMEA-based BN 
to represent the severity of failures from different prospects. Then, the utility values are 
combined in the overall risk to prioritise failures. 
 
A linear utility function is then used to calculate the crisp values (CV) for R as follows: 




where t is the number of the linguistic variables of a node, 𝑝(𝑅ℎ) the marginal probability and 
𝑈𝑧 (𝑧 = 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5)  the synthesised utility value assigned to R. Utility values are 
assigned in a linear form (i.e. 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) (e.g. Yu et al., 2020) to the five defined 
grades in order to convert the results into crisp risk scores. 
 
Step 6: Validation using sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is then applied to strengthen the reliability of the model and provide useful 
insights. Sensitivity analysis in this research is used to analyse how sensitive the RPN linguistic 
estimate (p(R)) is to minor changes in the inputs and to test the accuracy of the belief structures 
on the basis of subjective judgments (Yang et al., 2008). 
 
Jones et al. (2010) and Pristrom et al. (2016) suggest that BNs should satisfy a number of 
axioms in the uncertainty-sensitivity analysis as follows: 
 Axiom 1, a slight increase or decrease in the prior probabilities of each parent node 
should cause a relative change in the posterior probability of the child/target node 
(e.g. collision risk);  
 Axiom 2, given the variation of subjective probability distributions of each parent 
node, the influence magnitude from these parent nodes to the child/target node 
values should reflect the weights of the parent nodes and; 
 
4. Analysis and Results    
4.1 Rule-based Bayesian network results 
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The risk levels of MASS hazards are analysed using a ruled-based BN as described above. We 
first obtain the degrees of belief (DoB) for the three risk parameters (L,C,P).  For example, 
based on the aggregated expert opinion we calculate the likelihood of ‘Failure due to heavy 
weather’ (PE1) having the DoB illustrated in Fig. 3 (i.e. very high with a 13.96% DoB and so 
on). 
  
Fig. 3: Results of ER on the likelihood of  ‘Failure due to heavy weather’ (PE1) hazard 
 
In a similar way, we obtain the results of each risk parameter (L, C, P) with respect to each 
hazard (all parameters are expressed using the degrees of belief). They are, then, fed into the 
RBN to obtain the results of each hazard category. Due to space limitation and as an illustrative 
example, we describe the part of the Bayesian Network that is related to the ‘Human Error’ 
hazard category. The rest of the BN has been constructed and calculated in the same way. As 
shown in Fig. 4, three hazards are included under the category of ‘human error’, namely 
‘Human error due to a large scope of coding and programming when designing the system’ 
(left-hand side of the figure), ‘Failure due to poor design of on-board programme’ (middle), 































Fig. 4: Result of the assessment of the ‘Human Error’ hazard category 
 
Based on the aggregated expert opinion (the results of the ER analysis that is used as an input 
to the BN), the value of the likelihood ‘Human error due to a large scope of coding and 
programming when designing the system’ is around 1.91, with the following degrees of belief: 
2% of Very High (VH), 7% of High (H), 19% of Average (A), 24% of Low (L), and 48% of 
Very Low (VL); see the top-left corner of Figure 4.  
 
The value of consequence for the same hazard is around 3.98, with the following associated 
DoB: 38% of Catastrophic (CA), 37% of Critical (CR), 14% of Moderate (MO), 7% of 
Marginal (MA), and 4% of Negligible (N).   
 
The value of the probability of the failure being undetected is around 3.24, with 17% of Highly 
likely (HL), 28% of Likely (L), 24% of Average (A), 25% of Unlikely (U), and 7% of Highly 
Unlikely (HU). 
 
The values fed to the BN are used to calculate the risk for the assessed hazards for the ‘Human 
Error’ hazard category; see Fig.4. The risk (denoted as ‘value’ in the above figure) of the HE1 
hazard (‘Large scope coding’) is 45.9, the risk of HE2 (‘Poor on-board system’) is 44.5, and 
that of HE3 (‘Poor RCC system’) is 47.43. The overall risk for the ‘Human Error’ hazard 
category has a value of 45.99 (see value in the bottom middle box). 
 
In a similar way, the risk associated with all hazards and hazard categories can be obtained; see 
Table 8 for the overall results. Our results show that ‘Interaction with manned vessels and 
detection of objects’ is the hazard category with the highest risk (a risk value of 57.5), followed 
by ‘Cyber-attacks’ (a risk of 51.0), and ‘Human error’ (a risk value of 46.0). Looking at the 
hazards individually, all top three hazards belong the ‘Interaction with manned vessels and 
detection of objects’ hazard category; they are the ‘Failure in detection of semi-submerged 
objects that are adrift’ (risk value: 62.6), ‘Failure to determine correct action when interacting 
with vessels that are: towing, restricted in an ability to manoeuvre, or trawling’ (risk value: 



















Human error 46.0 Human error due to a large scope of coding and 
programming when designing the system (HE1) 
46.0 
Failure due to poor design of on-board programme (HE2) 44.5 





and detection of 
objects 
57.5 Collision due to poor interaction with manned vessel(s) in 
heavy traffic (IMV1) 
54.9 
Failure in detection of semi-submerged objects that are 
adrift (IMV2) 
62.6 
Failure to determine correct action when interacting with 
vessels that are: towing, restricted in an ability to 





35.0 Failure due to heavy weather (PE1) 41.1 
Failure due to strong tidal effect (PE2) 28.9 
System failure 32.4 Failure due to the breakdown of communication link 
(SF1) 
28.8 
Failure due to the jamming or spoofing of AIS or GPS 
signals (SF2) 
36.0 
Cyber-attacks 51.0 Communication between ships and shore control centre 
due to hacker attacks (CA1) 
49.5 





37.9 Fire loss of ship or systems (EF1) 41.6 
Sensor failure – loss of control (EF2) 40.9 
Temporary loss of electricity (e.g. due to black-out) - loss 
of control (EF3) 
33.7 
Failure of the ship's IT structure (e.g. due to fire in the 
server room) - no control (EF4) 
35.1 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis and validation 
Any BN-based risk model requires validation to check whether the model is robust and the 
results are reliable. This is particularly important when subjective judgements are involved in 
generating conclusions (Yu et al., 2020). Yang et al. (2009b) and Jones et al. (2010) suggest 
BNs should satisfy certain axioms in uncertainty-sensitivity analysis.  
GeNIe performs simple sensitivity analysis in Bayesian networks by simulating all the possible 
scenarios. This kind of sensitivity analysis can help validate the probability parameters of a BN 
by investigating the effect of small changes in numerical parameters (i.e., probabilities) on the 
output parameters (i.e the posterior probabilities). This is in line with the axioms presented in 
Section 3.2. 
To study the effects of different variables (i.e. hazards) to the overall risks, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis using the Genie software. The results are illustrated in Fig. 5 (overall risk 
is ‘very high’) and Fig. 6 (overall risk is ‘very low’). Each figure presents the effects of hazards 
to different overall risk states. For example, in Figure 5, it is observed that the value for CA2 
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varies between 0.1471 and 0.2042. This means when setting CA2 to 100% ‘very high’ (keeping 
the other figures constant), the ‘very high’ state of the overall risk (child node) is 0.20428. On 
the other extreme case, when setting CA2 to 0% ‘very high’, the ‘very high’ state of the overall 
risk (child node) becomes 0.1471. Therefore, based on Figure 5, CA2 has the highest impact 
magnitude to the child node, revealing its highest influential impact/weight. In a similar way, 
we see that HE2 (see bottom bar in Fig. 5) has the lowest influence/weight. 
 
Fig. 5: Sensitivity analysis results when the overall risk is very high 
 
Fig. 5 shows that when the overall risk is ‘very high’ (VH), the influential magnitude of SF1 
to overall risk is the lowest (notice the left part of the SF1 bar), which means that failures 
related to communication link are rarely associated with very high expected risks. In contrast, 
‘Communication between ships and shore control centre due to hacker attacks’ (CA1) and 
‘Failure of the operation system due to hacker attacks’ (CA2) show significant influence on the 
overall risk, thus selected as the two most critical hazards under the high-risk situation.  
 
Fig. 6:  Sensitivity analysis results when the overall risk is very low 
 
Figure 6 illustrates two important critical situations affecting the overall risk of autonomous 
ships: (a) operating on good weather (as opposed to ‘under heavy weather’ scenario) would 
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significantly reduce the overall risk to a ‘very low’ level (green part of PE1) and (b) ‘failures 
in communication links’ will significantly increase the overall risk (red part of SF1). The figure 
also shows that improvements on on-board systems should not be considered when the overall 
MASS risk is under a ‘very low’ risk level because poor on-board systems have small positive 
effects (green part of HE2). Based on the above results of the sensitivity analysis, it is clear 
that Axioms 1 and 2 are satisfied. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
5.1 Discussion 
The results of the BN model show that ‘human error’ ranks as the third top hazard in MASS 
operations. This implies that the contribution of human error to the overall risk of MASS 
operations is still large; a probable explanation is that experts believe that hazards related to 
human error shift from the area of the actual operations, in conventional shipping, to that of 
programme/software design in the case of MASS. For example, a poor design of software or 
the remote control centre could lead to losing control of ships and, thus, causing further 
accidents. Therefore, shipping companies still have to pay much attention to such human error 
related hazards.  
Our analysis shows that the two top hazard categories are ‘Interaction with manned vessels and 
detection of objects’ and ‘Cyber-attacks’. Expert opinion leads to the belief that MASS could 
introduce some new types of risks that do not exist in conventional operations. In addition, 
according to Table 6 the top three hazards are all related to the ‘Interaction with manned vessels 
and detection of objects’. The importance of the top two hazards has also been highlighted in 
previous studies; see Burmeister et al. (2014b), Porathe et al. (2014), Rødseth and Burmeister 
(2015), and Wróbel et al. (2018b) for studies related the ‘Interaction with vessels and detection 
of objects’, and Katsikas (2017), Ghaderi (2018), Tam and Jones (2018), and Wróbel et al. 
(2018b; 2020) for the ‘cyber-attacks’ hazard category. Based on the relevant literature, there is 
still much work needed in order to meet the desired safety level for autonomous operations. 
Our results suggest that shipping companies that are interested in developing and operating 
autonomous vessels should prioritise research on technology and development that can quickly 
and correctly detect ships and objects. Moreover, maritime cybersecurity is becoming an 
important issue. Operators should address the relevant risks by, among others, setting up 
standardised operation procedures, and cybersecurity awareness and training (Park et al., 2019). 
In addition, our results also show that ‘Heavy weather’ is a considerable hazard to autonomous 
ship operations; this is in line with Rødseth and Burmeister (2015) who state that heavy weather 
may make it difficult to safely manoeuvre an autonomous vessels. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that ‘Failure due to the breakdown of 
communication link’ and ‘Failure due to strong tidal effect’ are the hazards associated with the 
lowest risk values. Despite Wróbel et al. (2020) stating that specialists pay much attention to 
communication, the result of our research shows that ‘failure due to the breakdown of 
communication link’ contributes to the low risk values, compared to other hazards that need to 
be dealt with first.  
 
5.2 Conclusions  
In this paper, we have initially identified the hazards of MASS operations and categorised them 
into six categories through literature review. In addition, we conducted a number of interviews 
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to validate and explore more hazards that had not been identified during the literature review.  
Our study utilised a combination of FMEA, with ER and RBN in order to rank the identified 
hazards. The input values are derived from surveys based on domain expert judgements. 
The results show that ‘Interaction with manned vessels and detection of objects’ is the hazard 
category that contributes the most to the overall risk of MASS operations, followed by ‘Cyber-
attacks’, ‘Human error’ and ‘Equipment failure’. Our analysis shows that ‘Failure in detection 
of semi-submerged objects that are adrift’ is the hazard of the highest risk value (falls actually 
into the extremely high risk zone), followed by ‘Failure to determine correct action when 
interacting with vessels that are: towing, restricted in an ability to manoeuvre, or trawling’, and 
‘Collision due to poor interaction with manned vessel(s) in heavy traffic’. All the above three 
hazards are under the ‘Interaction with manned vessels and detection of objects’ hazard 
category. 
The results of this work can lead to better understanding of the relevant hazards and their risk 
levels. Although this area is attracting more and more interest, as shown by the increasing 
number of publications, we note that the literature is still scarce, and more research is needed. 
One suggestion is to use a more detailed breakdown of hazards and hazard categories so that 
the associated influencing factors can be further analysed, which can lead to more specific and 
more effective risk control measures. 
During the research process, we reckon some limitations of this work. Firstly, obtaining the 
opinion of more experts could help enhance the findings. Secondly, a study needs to be carried 
out to identify and analyse potential risk control options to address the major hazards that this 
study has identified. Our approach can actually be used to calculate the impact of the 
introduction of such options. As a final remark, we highlight the need for more research in the 
area, which is actually now getting more and more attention.  
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